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The recent crisis has demonstrated that a financially open economy has many sources of 
vulnerability.  Even when a country does its homework, it remains at the mercy of developments 
in external financial markets.  So, one lesson is that policy needs to guard not just against 
domestic shocks, but also shocks that emanate from financial instability elsewhere.  Complete 
financial openness is not the best policy.  A second lesson is that Turkey’s prevailing growth 
strategy does not generate enough growth and employment. Therefore it would be a mistake for 
the country to return to the status quo ante and resuscitate a model that fails to make adequate 
use of domestic resources.  Most importantly, Turkey has to learn to live with reduced reliance 
on external borrowing.  The paper discusses the needed realignments in fiscal and exchange-rate 
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  Turkey is coming out of yet another financial crisis.  This one may not have been its own 
doing, but that has not reduced the pain.  In fact Turkey was hit worse in many ways by the 
present crisis than in any of the previous instances of sudden stop in capital inflows.  And this 
despite the admirable resilience of domestic banks and the dramatic cuts in interest rates that the 
central bank undertook.  Unemployment reached historic heights and the drops in GDP and 
industrial output were exceptionally severe. 
  Macroeconomic instability has long been the bane of Turkey’s economy.  In the past the 
culprits were easy to identify.  You could blame irresponsible monetary policies, unsustainable 
fiscal expenditures, poor financial regulation, or inconsistent exchange-rate policies.  It is to the 
country’s credit that as it came out of the 2001 crisis Turkey succeeded to fix these traditional 
sources of fragility.  Monetary policy is governed by an inflation targeting framework and an 
independent central bank.  Fiscal policy has been generally restrained and the public debt-to-
GDP ratio stable or declining.  Banks have strong balance sheets, and regulation and supervision 
are much tighter than before.  The currency is afloat.  When it comes to macroeconomic 
management, Turkey has adopted all the best practices.   
  The crisis has demonstrated that a financially open economy has many sources of 
vulnerability.  Even when a country does its homework, it remains at the mercy of developments 
in external financial markets.  Crises and contagion are endemic to financial globalization.  The 
world of finance does not always operate in a benign fashion.  So lesson number one is that 
policy needs to guard not just against domestic shocks, but also shocks that emanate from   2
financial instability elsewhere.  This has important implications for the optimal degree of 
financial integration for middle-income countries like Turkey.  In particular, it suggests that 
complete financial openness may not be the best policy.  A counter-cyclical approach to the 
capital account—encouraging inflows when finance is scarce but discouraging them when 
finance is plentiful—deserves serious consideration. 
A second lesson has to do with Turkey’s growth strategy.  The Turkish economy grew at 
quite rapid rates in the years before the most recent crisis.  This can be interpreted as the reward 
for the solid macro policies pursued since 2001.  At the same time, there were too many 
disconcerting elements in this growth experience.  In particular, domestic saving fell (instead of 
rising, as it should have done in an environment of increased macro stability and confidence) and 
unemployment remained stubbornly high.  The external deficit kept on widening.  Investment 
remained lower than required.  All of these put the sustainability of the economic boom into 
question.  Even if the sub-prime mortgage crisis had never taken place, Turkey’s prevailing 
pattern of growth would have run into problems.  Therefore it would be a mistake for the country 
to return to the status quo ante and resuscitate a model that fails to make adequate use of 
domestic resources.  Most importantly, Turkey has to learn to live with reduced reliance on 
external borrowing. 
I begin the paper by comparing the present crisis to the two previous ones Turkey went 
through since having become financially globalized (in 1994 and 2001).  By juxtaposing the 
trends in the major economic indicators during these three crises we can discern common 
elements as well as important differences.  The main point that comes out of this comparison is 
that Turkey is emerging from the present crisis with a significantly higher level of 
unemployment and a much more appreciated real exchange rate.     3
Next I present two growth narratives which differ with respect to the nature of binding 
constraints faced by the Turkish economy and have conflicting implications for policy.  The first 
narrative views financing as the key constraint while the second narrative emphasizes a profit 
squeeze in tradables.  Depending on which of these one views as the dominant narrative, the 
approach to the external accounts and exchange-rate policy would take very different forms.  
Unfortunately, a quick overview of the evidence does not allow a very clear-cut conclusion to be 
reached.  The Turkish economy presents elements of both types of constraints.  Nevertheless, it 
is possible to draw some broad policy conclusions, and I will close the paper with those.  
 
How does the present crisis compare to previous ones? 
  Financial crises in emerging markets may be sparked by different causes, but they tend to 
follow similar scripts.  They begin with a sharp turnaround in financial flows—what Guillermo 
Calvo has memorably called a “sudden stop.”  The drying up of credit in turn sets off a chain of 
events.  The value of the domestic currency collapses.  Domestic banks are starved of liquidity so 
they begin to call in their loans.  Firms need to retrench and lay off workers.  The economy needs 
to generate an external surplus in short order, which requires a sharp fall in domestic demand.  
This now adds a demand shock to the initial supply shock, and further aggravates the cost to 
output.  Eventually the depreciated currency helps revive demand for domestic tradables, the 
panic subsides, and capital begins to move in again. 
  Turkey has gone through three of these crises since it opened up its capital account in 
1989.  The first instance was 1994, when a misguided attempt to keep domestic interest rates low 
led to a sudden capital outflow.  The second was in 2001 when a minor political crisis threw the 
sustainability of an exchange-rate based stabilization program into question and led to a massive   4
withdrawal of funds.  And the third happened in 2008 as a result of the global flight to safety that 
the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis produced.
1 
  Since the turnaround in capital flows is the instigator of the crisis, it is useful to look at 
how each one of these episodes unfolded as the events in financial markets played out.  In the 
charts that follow, I juxtapose the time series for the three crises by plotting them against a time 
scale where each quarter stands in the same relation to the quarter with the peak amount of 
inflows.
2  Financial inflows reached their peak in 1993:I, 2000:II, and 2008:II, respectively, so 
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1 See Uygur (2009) for a detailed discussion of Turkey’s performance during the recent crisis, along with an 
evaluation of the policies followed. 
 
2 Unless specified otherwise, all data come from the Central Bank’s online data retrieval facility.   5
Figure 1 compares the patterns of financial flows during these three crises.  It makes clear 
that Turkey was a large net recipient of financial inflows at the onset of each crisis.  At their peak 
net inflows amounted to somewhere between 35-50 percent of the gross volume of exports of 
goods and services.  The figure also shows the rapidity of the turnaround.  In 2001 and 2008, 
these large inflows not only quickly evaporated, but within two quarters they had been replaced 
by sizable net outflows.  The first three quarters of the 2001 and 2008 crises bear in fact an 
uncanny resemblance.  But thereafter an interesting divergence sets in.  In the 2001 crises, it took 
roughly two years for financial inflows to turn positive once again.  In the current crisis, the 
resumption of capital inflows happened much more quickly and by t=5 (2009:III, the latest 
quarter for which we have data) Turkey had become a sizable recipient of inflows once again.  
What happened was that the stabilization of global financial market conditions produced a 
resurgence in capital flows to emerging markets.  Turkey was among the beneficiaries.  As we 
shall see, however, this may well turn out to be a mixed blessing.     
  When foreign finance dries up, the current account deficit has to be quickly reduced and 
eliminated.  As Figure 2 shows, the Turkish economy entered all three crises with a large current 
account deficit.  And in all three cases, there was a significant adjustment in the current account 
over a period of 5-6 quarters.  The current account balance turns positive typically within a year-
and-a-half of peak inflows.  But the evidence from the older crises (1994 and 2001) also shows 
that this adjustment tends to be temporary.  Three years after these crises, Turkey was again 
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Figure 2   
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Figure 3   7
 
  The adjustment in the external balance is achieved in part through a significant 
realignment of the real exchange rate.  In the crises of 1994 and 2001, the real exchange rate 
depreciated on the order of 30-40 percent.  A similar depreciation took place in 2009 as well, but 
as Figure 3 shows, the depreciation was much more short-lived in the latest crisis.  By the second 
quarter of 2009, the Turkish lira had already begun to appreciate.  This is clearly linked to the 
more rapid resumption in capital inflows in the current crisis.  What Figure 3 also revels is that 
Turkey entered this latest crisis with a more appreciated real exchange rate than it had entered 
either of the previous two crises.  So the quick appreciation is doubly problematic.  I will return 
to the competitiveness issue below.   
  Another distinguishing feature of the latest crisis is that the adverse effects on the real 
economy were deeper and felt much more quickly than in previous crises.  Figures 4, 5, and 6 
depict the comparative outcomes in industrial production, real GDP, and unemployment.  Both 
real GDP and industrial production took a severe tumble as soon as financial flows turned 
around, and their fall was more pronounced than anything seen to date.  The decline in real GDP 
during the first quarter of 2009 was the worst on record since 1945.  But the recovery in 
economic activity has also been comparatively rapid.  By the end of 2009, even though the 
Turkish economy stood considerably below its previous growth path, the worst was clearly 
behind.   8
Industrial production
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Figure 4  
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Figure 5      9
 
  However, it is more difficult to feel optimistic on the unemployment front (Figure 6).  
The rate of unemployment has come down somewhat since having reached a record-breaking 
level approaching 16 percent in 2009:1.  But unemployment already stood at much higher levels 
at the onset of the 2008-09 crisis than in any of the previous crises, and is unlikely to fall much 
further.  The unemployment rate has remained stubbornly high despite rapid growth since 2001, 
and this remains one of the blemishes of Turkey’s recent performance.  Going forward, any 
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   10
  A final difference in the recent crisis relates to export performance (Figure 7).  In 
previous crises, an important mechanism driving the recovery was a rapid increase in exports, 
driven in large part by a competitive currency.  As Figure 7 shows, exports have taken a very 
different path during the 2008-09 crisis.  Export volume fell until early 2009, and has remained 
stable subsequently.  There has not been a strong export response at all.  The difference is due, in 
the first instance, to the fall in global demand, which resulted in a worldwide collapse in trade.  
This prevented external demand from operating as an adjustment mechanism in Turkey and other 
emerging markets.  But the short-lived real depreciation of the Turkish Lira must also be a factor.  
As the Lira began to appreciate again in 2009, it undercut the incentives of firms to export.  For 
both sets of reasons, exports are not contributing much momentum to economic activity in the 
present crisis.             
Export quantum
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Figure 7    
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  These comparisons and quick overview reveal that despite many strengths the Turkish 
economy is emerging from the current crisis with some important weaknesses.  The resumption 
of capital inflows is indicative of a renewed vote of confidence on the part of financial markets 
in the underlying health of the Turkish economy.  The quick rebound in economic activity 
suggests the worst of the crisis is over.  Yet unemployment is extremely high by Turkish 
standards and the real exchange rate remains very appreciated.  How alarming are these features 
of the current recovery?  The answer depends in large part on what we think is an appropriate 
growth model for Turkey. 
 
Two contending growth narratives 
  In developing countries growth is produced by structural change.  It requires moving their 
resources—predominantly labor—from low productivity activities such as traditional agriculture 
and informality to high-productivity modern and mostly tradable activities such as 
manufacturing.  The more rapid this movement, the higher the growth rate of the economy.  The 
facts that so many countries remain poor and the rate of convergence is rarely positive are 
indicative of the magnitude of the inherent market and institutional failures that block this 
transformation.  Weak market systems, externalities, and poor governance exert a 
disproportionate tax on the modern parts of the economy, preventing rapid structural change in 
the absence of corrective government policies.  This is why growth is never an automatic 
process, and requires proactive policies in addition to sound macroeconomic fundamentals. 
  Among the various constraints that prevent the take-off of modern tradable activities, two 
are particularly important.  First, modern industrial activities may be too slow to expand because 
of problems of access to credit and a shortage of finance.  Second, these activities may be   12
hampered by low private returns, despite the presence of high social returns, due to a range of 
learning spillovers or institutional shortcomings.  Of course under-developed countries suffer not 
from a single malady but from a whole host of problems.  In reality developing countries may be 
plagued both by poor finance and by poor returns.  But as desirable as it may be to try to remove 
all these problems at the same time, this is neither practical nor necessary.  As the experience of 
successful countries demonstrates, what is required is strategic prioritization.  If we can develop 
a sense of where the most important bottlenecks lie, we can address the problems sequentially.  
So it is of great practical importance to know whether it is poor finance or poor returns that acts 
as the most binding constraint (Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco, 2008). 
  Until recently, the mental model that dominated thinking about economic growth was 
based on the presumption of capital shortage.  This model held that low savings and weak 
financial markets at home were first-order constraints on economic growth and development.  
Thus greater access to investible funds from abroad and improved financial intermediation would 
provide a powerful boost to domestic investment and growth along with better consumption 
smoothing.  As some of the downsides of financial globalization became more evident, 
proponents of this view began to recognize the potential financial instability and crises.  But the 
conclusion that they drew was that sufficiently vigilant prudential regulation and supervision 
would ameliorate the attendant risks.  Given the presumed importance of access to international 
finance, the model required that policy makers give very high priority to the implementation of 
appropriate regulatory structures in finance. 
We can restate this argument in the form of a three-pronged syllogism:  (1) Developing 
nations are constrained by finance and therefore need foreign capital to grow.  (2) But foreign 
capital can be risky if they do not pursue prudent macroeconomic policies and appropriate   13
prudential regulation. (3) So developing countries must become ever more vigilant as they open 
themselves up to capital flows.  This syllogism remains at the core of the case for financial 
globalization (Rodrik and Subramanian 2009).  
Recent evidence has thrown some cold water on the premise of this syllogism.  The 
cross-country evidence on the growth benefits of capital-account openness turns out to be 
inconclusive.  Even more damaging, it appears that countries that have grown most rapidly in 
recent decades are those that have relied less (not more) on foreign capital.  In addition, 
financially globalized developing countries have experienced less, not more, consumption 
smoothing.  These results are at variance with the presupposition that poorer nations need foreign 
finance in order to develop.  To make sense of what is going on, we need a different mental 
model.   
The alternative narrative goes as follows. While some nations may be severely 
constrained by inadequate access to finance, others—and perhaps a majority—are constrained 
primarily by poor returns.  The essential problem here lies with inadequate investment demand 
due either to low social returns or to low private appropriability of social returns.  The problem is 
particularly acute in tradables, which are the essential source of growth.  In such settings capital 
inflows exacerbate the investment constraint through their effect on the real exchange rate.  The 
real appreciation of the home currency which accompanies capital inflows reduces the 
profitability of investment in tradables and depresses the private sector’s willingness to invest.  It 
thereby reduces economic growth.  So openness to foreign finance ends up being a handicap 
rather than an advantage.  
  These two syndromes—poor finance and poor returns—can be differentiated by posing 
the following hypothetical question to would-be entrepreneurs and investors in an economy:  if   14
you were to receive an unexpected inheritance of $25 million, where would you invest it?  In an 
economy where the binding constraint is lack of finance, this sudden windfall serves to relax the 
constraint and therefore permits the undertaking of investment projects that would not have been 
possible otherwise.  Entrepreneurs in such an economy are therefore likely to respond to the 
question with a long list of sectors: agribusiness, tourism, call centers, auto parts, 
pharmaceuticals, and so on.  These are all instances of profitable investments that could be 
undertaken if finance were available at reasonable cost.     
On the other hand, when the binding constraint is low returns the windfall provides no 
additional inducement to invest—at least not in the home economy.  In this alternative economy, 
the respondent is most likely to fall into a long silence, scratch his head, and then say something 
like: “can I take the money to Switzerland instead?”   
As real-world counterparts to these two prototype economies, think of Brazil and 
Argentina.  In Brazil, private entrepreneurs have no shortage of investment ideas, and even with 
real interest rates at double-digit levels until recently, the investment rate stood relatively high.  
When the finance constraint is relaxed in Brazil, either because interest rates fall or foreign 
finance becomes more plentiful, domestic investment rises.  Argentina is somewhat different.  In 
that country, there is much greater uncertainty about the credibility of government policies and 
the stability of the rules of the game, so the tendency is for private investment to remain low, 
even when finance is plentiful and cheap.  What fosters private investment in the Argentinean 
economic environment is a big boost in the relative profitability of tradables, which offsets these 
other distortions.  So when the government actively managed the exchange rate in recent years to 
maintain an undervalued peso, the private sector responded with an investment boom in   15
tradables—despite the continued lack of credibility in government policies.  The Argentinean 
economy grew rapidly—more rapidly in fact than Brazil’s economy. 
As these examples illustrate, identifying desirable economic policies requires taking a 
stand on the nature of the binding constraint.  If the binding constraint is finance, we should look 
kindly on capital inflows and moderately large current account deficits, even though they are 
likely to produce currency appreciation and overvaluation.  The costs of overvaluation are likely 
to be more than offset in this instance by the benefits in the form of increased availability of 
investible funds.  For an economy like Brazil, it is more important to stimulate finance than it is 
to enhance returns.  But the same set of policies would be disastrous in Argentina.  Capital 
inflows and currency appreciation would not spur domestic investment (at least not in tradables); 
they would instead lower domestic saving and boost consumption (as they did indeed in the 
1990s).   
The question that faces Turkey, then, is essentially this:  Is Turkey more like Brazil or 
more like Argentina?  It turns out that this is not an easy question to answer.  I will provide a first 
pass through the evidence here, leaving a more detailed analysis to another occasion (or to 
others).   
 
Reading the tea leaves of the Turkish economy    
  As it came out of the 2001 crisis, Turkey came to rely increasingly on foreign borrowing 
to fuel its growth.  The widening of the current account deficit went along with a sizable 
appreciation of the real exchange rate.  What does this most recent experience tell us about the 
nature of the binding constraint in Turkey?     16
  Consider first some of the evidence that would suggest that Turkey is, like Brazil, a 
finance-constrained economy.  It is telling that real interest rates have been quite high and at 
double digit levels—at least until the recent crisis.  Among emerging markets, Turkey’s real 
interest rates are in fact second only to Brazil’s (Kannan 2008).  Such high rates render the cost 
of external finance prohibitive for all but the most profitable investments.  Despite the high cost 
of finance, however, private investment has held its own and has hovered in the 16-18 percent 
rage (in relation to GDP) prior to the crisis (Figure 8).  This is not very high compared to Asian 
countries, but it must be considered a decent performance, and indicative of the presence of high 
returns in general given the cost of capital.  The high level of external borrowing in recent years 
has clearly helped sustain domestic investment and counteract somewhat the adverse effects of 
high interest rates.   
  What is perhaps even more striking is that the composition of investment has been 
moving in the direction of tradables, and manufacturing in particular (Figure 9).  In 2000, 
manufacturing made up a quarter of total investment; by 2008, this ratio had increased to almost 
50 percent!  This is a remarkable transformation, rendered all the more striking by the fact that 
the real exchange rate has appreciated by around 20 percent in the interval.  A somewhat similar 
picture can be seen when we turn to exports, where significant gains in terms of expansion and 
diversification have been recorded in recent years (see World Bank 2008, chap. 2).  The strength 
of manufacturing investment and exports, despite the appreciation, is another piece of evidence 
suggesting private returns are high.       17
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  Third, recent experience with foreign-borrowing led growth has produced a rather good 
performance in terms of growth and productivity.  Figure 10 summarizes economic outcomes 
during three different periods of Turkey’s recent history: the 1980s, the 1990s, and 2000-2008.  
For each period, the figure provides the growth rates of three different measures of productivity: 
GDP per capita, GDP per worker, and manufacturing value added per worker.  The post-2000 
period looks uniformly good, irrespective of which measure of productivity growth we focus on.  
With the exception of the growth in MVA per worker, post-2000 performance dominates the 
experience in all previous periods.              19

















Figure 10    
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators and SPO. 
  
It is clear that recent economic growth has come at the expense of growing current 
account deficits and an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  But the indicators reviewed above 
suggest that this growth has been quite healthy in a number of respects: it has come through 
higher investment in tradables, especially in manufacturing which exhibits strong performance 
despite some degree of overvaluation of the currency.  So far, the picture suggests an economy 
that is constrained more by finance than by low returns.   
  Now consider the other side of the story.  First, it is worth reiterating that aggregate 
investment remains low in Turkey, despite the support it receives from foreign savings.  At its 
peak, gross capital formation amounted to 23 percent of GDP in 2006 (Figure 11), which is   20
considerably lower than the rates we observe in high-performing Asian economies.  It may be 
true that Turkey invests more than would be expected for a country where real interests are so 
high, but it is equally true that there is considerable upside room for increasing the investment 
effort in the economy.  There is no reason why the Turkish economy cannot grow even more 
rapidly (and indeed it will certainly have to if the excess supply of labor is to be absorbed in 
coming years).  
  Figure 11 shows why investment remains low even at high levels of current account 
deficits: the domestic saving rate has fallen during the 2000s and remains quite depressed.  So in 
2006, a substantial resource transfer from abroad in the amount of 6 percent (of GDP) could 
barely lift the domestic investment effort up to 23 percent.  A desirable investment rate for 
Turkey would be closer to 28 percent.  As long as Turkey remains outside the Eurozone, a 
sustainable and “safe” level of current account deficits will not surpass 6 percent—and indeed 
may even lie below that number.  Anything higher will leave the country in risk of periodic 
sudden stops.  In other words, with domestic saving so low, there are inherent limits to how 
much the current account can help finance domestic investment, even if we accept that the 
binding constraint lies on the financing side.  Regardless of the nature of the binding constraint, 
raising growth in the future will necessitate a significant increase in the domestic saving effort.     21
















  Perhaps the strongest bit of evidence that suggests Turkey needs a different growth 
strategy is the dismal record on employment creation and on unemployment.  As Figure 12 
shows, Turkey’s unemployment rate jumped from a range of 6-8 percent during the 1990s to a 
new plateau of 9-12 percent following the 2001 crisis.  In the aftermath of the current crisis, 
unemployment may well get stuck at even higher levels still.  This is both an economic and 
social problem.  On the economic front, it means that there is gross underutilization of domestic 
resources.  On the social front, it is the harbinger of political difficulties and tensions that may 
become difficult to overcome if left unresolved.  For both sets of reasons, a healthy growth 
strategy will need to focus explicitly on job creation.  That means both a higher growth rate and   22

















































  The bottom line is this.  Foreign borrowing does boost growth in Turkey, because private 
returns in tradables are relatively high and current account deficits permit greater investment 
than would be possible otherwise (despite the associated reduction in competitiveness).  
However, this model of growth places too low a ceiling on growth and does not permit a rapid 
enough generation of jobs to prevent unemployment from rising.  Faster growth would require, 
under the prevailing strategy, an unsustainably large external deficit.  The only alternative is to 
move to a model of growth that breaks the link between growth and the current account deficit.    23
This alternative strategy would require a substantial effort in terms of domestic saving 
mobilization, in addition to maintaining high private returns in tradables.  
 
Concluding remarks 
  We can summarize the story outlined here as follows.  Turkey needs to grow more 
rapidly; and it can also grow more rapidly.  Turkey has a growth potential that recent 
performance, successful as it may be, has not fully exploited.   
A growth model that relies on foreign savings and large current account deficits can 
generate respectable growth, but it runs into inherent problems.  For one thing, given the present 
level of domestic saving, a substantial rise in domestic investment would push the external 
deficits to heights that would clearly be unsustainable and dangerous. And second, even 
moderate reliance on foreign savings, as we have seen during the recent crisis, leaves the 
domestic economy vulnerable to sudden stops and confidence reversals that originate from 
external sources.  A comparison with Brazil is again instructive here.  Brazil entered the 2008-09 
crisis with a much smaller external imbalance than Turkey, and as a result has experienced a 
much more shallow recession. 
If growth is going to be financed domestically, Turkey will need a permanently higher 
saving rate.  Fiscal policy has a critical role here.  The most direct way in which domestic saving 
can be increased is to increase the structural surplus of the public sector.  The medium-term 
programs of the government must target a large enough fiscal surplus to leave room for the 
Central Bank to move interest rates to a permanently lower plateau.  An increase in public saving 
will reduce capital inflows, prevent the current account deficit from rising, and help sustain a   24
more competitive currency.  This step is a critical element in moving Turkey to a new growth 
path.  
But more will need to happen for all the pieces to fall into place.  A few numbers can 
help quantify the nature of the challenge facing Turkey in moving to an alternative growth 
model.  A sustainable and safe current account deficit for Turkey would not much exceed 3 
percent of GDP, so let’s take that number as the upper limit on the resource transfer from abroad.  
A desirable target for the investment effort would be around 28 percent, to ensure high enough 
growth keeps unemployment in check.  This implies a domestic saving rate of at least 25 percent.  
This is a whopping 9 percentage points higher than the 16 percent achieved by the Turkish 
economy in the years just prior to the 2008-09 crisis (see Figure 11).  Obviously, such a large 
increase in saving cannot be achieved through a rebalancing of public sector accounts alone.  So 
is this target at all realistic? 
The record of fast-growing countries—not just Asian economies but also Chile since the 
mid-1980s—suggests a positive answer.  All these economies experienced significant saving 
transitions at the onset of their growth accelerations (Rodrik 2000).  A positive growth dynamic 
is in fact one of the most important factors sustaining a rapid increase in private (and especially 
corporate) saving.  When growth rises in a sustained manner, it also induces higher saving.  The 
prospect of high earnings growth leads firms to increase their retained earnings, which in turn 
feeds into higher investment and growth.  A determined fiscal effort along with a competitive 
currency, then, has the potential to crowd in the private saving required to close the gap. 
If a shift in fiscal policy provides the first plank of the new growth strategy, a second 
would be the signaling of a new policy attitude towards the exchange rate.  Currently, the official 
line is that the Central Bank intervenes in currency markets only to smooth short-term   25
fluctuations, without taking a stand on the medium-term level of the exchange rate.  This has to 
be replaced with a clear statement of preference in favor of preventing overvaluation.  The 
Central Bank, the Treasury and the Finance Ministry need to cooperate and coordinate when 
capital inflows threaten to push the value of the currency up.  Policy makers have many policy 
instruments they can use to stem appreciation.  A combination of sterilized intervention, 
prudential restrictions on inflows, liquidity requirements aimed at stemming foreign borrowing 
and other fiscal measures can be effective if deployed with sufficient determination.  None of 
this needs to be inconsistent with inflation targeting as long as the performance of tradables 
features prominently in the Central Bank’s evaluation of potential growth of the real economy 
and fiscal policy allows sufficient room for monetary policy to be counter-cyclical with respect 
to capital inflows. 
The key point is that private sector saving and investment behavior is unlikely be 
transformed unless there is a credible shift in the policy regime with regard to both the fiscal 
stance and the exchange rate.     26
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